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A
mAbstract
Although there is a large literature on employment effects of earned income tax
credits (EITCs) and unemployment benefits, less is known about wage effects. In our
model, the impact is via the net (after-tax) replacement rate. Using a panel of
individuals from Sweden, we find a positive relationship between the net
replacement rate and wages with semi-elasticities in the range 0.2-0.4. This implies
that a one per cent reduction in the unemployment benefit level or a one per cent
increase in the net-of-tax rate is associated with a fall in the before-tax wage of
0.1-0.2 per cent. EITCs and unemployment benefit reductions are thus likely to induce
wage moderation.
JEL-codes: J31; J38; H24
Keywords: Earned income tax credit; Unemployment benefits; Wage formation1 Introduction
Starting in the mid-1980s, labour market reforms have been implemented in many
developed economies with the aim of reducing unemployment and raising employment
in the longer term. The reforms have often involved reductions in the generosity of
unemployment insurance and the introduction of earned income tax credits
(EITCs), i.e. tax reductions on income from employment only, in order to increase
the return to work. A large amount of empirical research has studied the impact on
unemployment and employment. However, although theoretical models usually identify
wage reductions as the crucial mechanism through which employment is influenced,
there has been surprisingly little research on wage effects. The aim of this paper is to help
fill this gap.
Empirical studies of how unemployment benefits influence unemployment are of
two types: microeconometric studies of the duration of unemployment and panel
studies trying to explain unemployment differences both across and within countries
over time. But the number of studies of how benefits influence individuals' reservation
wages is small compared to the number of studies of the effects on unemployment
duration, as noted by Shimer and Werning (2007). Most of the studies are old. Some
of them, such as Lynch (1983), Holzer (1986), van den Berg (1990) and Bloemen and
Stancanelli (2001), find quite small elasticities of reservation wages with respect to2014 Bennmarker et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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Poterba 1984) estimate substantially larger elasticities. Macroeconomic panel studies
seldom examine the relation between unemployment benefits and wages1 but instead
estimate reduced-form relationships between unemployment and other variables in-
cluding unemployment benefits (see, e.g., Bassanini and Duval 2009).
The situation is similar with respect to EITCs. Many studies - mainly for the US -
have exploited the natural experiment that only some groups (mainly single mothers)
have received the tax credit. Using difference-in-differences techniques, large employ-
ment effects on the extensive margin (the number of employed persons) have been
identified (see e.g. Hotz and Scholz 2003 and Eissa and Hoynes 2006). The effects have
been interpreted as labour supply effects even though higher labour force participation
can be translated into higher employment only if wages fall such that an increased
labour demand is forthcoming. Indeed, a few studies, including Rothstein (2008),
Azmat (2009) and Leigh (2010), have found that EITCs cause substantial wage reduc-
tions. Rothstein finds that low-skilled mothers in the US keep only 70 per cent of every
dollar they receive in EITC because of wage falls. Azmat comes up with a similar esti-
mate for male claimants of the Working Family Tax Credit in the UK. Leigh’s finding is
that a 10 per cent increase in the generosity of the EITC in the US causes wage reduc-
tions of 5 per cent for high-school drop-outs and 2 per cent for those with only a high-
school diploma.
In standard labour supply-demand models, general-equilibrium wage reductions at-
tenuate the employment effects that would follow from partial-equilibrium supply-side
effects (increased labour force participation), as stressed by Rothstein (2008, 2010).
However, as Kolm and Tonin (2011) show, this result need not hold in a Mortensen-
Pissarides search-matching model. The job creation induced by the wage fall, because it
becomes more profitable for firms to open up vacancies, may increase the expected
value of entering the labour force since unemployment spells are shortened.
EITCs have often been introduced with the double objective of raising employment
and alleviating poverty. To the extent that the EITCs' incidence is on employers by
reducing wages, the measure's efficiency in achieving both targets is reduced. Instead, a
trade-off emerges: the more effective an EITC is in raising employment through
wage reductions, the less effective it is in raising the living standards of the recipi-
ents (Rothstein 2010; Swedish Fiscal Policy Council 2010).
Our paper examines the effects of unemployment benefits and EITCs on wages by
using micro data from Sweden for 2004-2009. This period encompassed large reduc-
tions in the generosity of unemployment benefits as well as the introduction (and
expansion) of an EITC in 2007-2009. Since all wage earners are eligible for the EITC in
Sweden, it is not possible to differentiate between groups who have received the tax
credit and groups who have not. Instead, we exploit variations in the size of the tax
credit between individuals. We employ a search-matching framework according to
which both unemployment benefits and EITCs influence wages through their effect on
the net replacement rate (the ratio between after-tax incomes of unemployed and
employed workers). Our set-up also allows us to study the wage effects of income tax
progressivity and payroll taxes.
In most of our estimations, we find a significantly positive relationship between the
net replacement rate and the wage. This implies that a reduction in unemployment
Bennmarker et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2014) 3:54 Page 3 of 20benefits and an EITC tend to reduce wages. As in the wage studies for the US and the
UK quoted above, the magnitude is substantial: a one percentage point lower net
replacement rate is associated with lower nominal wages in the order of magnitude of
0.2-0.4 per cent. This means that a one per cent decrease in the unemployment benefit
level or a one per cent increase in the net-of-tax rate is associated with a wage fall of
0.1-0.2 per cent. We also find that higher income tax progressivity is associated with
lower wages, although the size of the effects is more unstable here: some estimates
suggest small effects, whereas others suggest substantial ones. We find little evidence
of wage effects of payroll tax changes. Overall, our estimations suggest that wage reduc-
tions are likely to be an important mechanism through which EITCs and lower
unemployment benefits influence the labour market.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the reforms relevant to wage
formation in Sweden in 2007-2009. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework. Sec-
tion 4 outlines our empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents
empirical results. Section 7 concludes.2 Swedish labour market reforms
The majority of Swedish wage earners are eligible for an income-dependent unemploy-
ment benefit administered by unemployment insurance funds. Prior to 2007, the
before-tax replacement rate was 80 per cent for those with a wage income below a
ceiling and above a floor. From 2007, the replacement rate was made dependent on
unemployment duration. An unemployed worker with a previous income between the
floor and the ceiling now faces a before-tax replacement rate of 80 per cent for the first
200 days. After 200 days, the replacement rate drops to 70 per cent for the next 100 days
(250 days for parents of minors). After that, an unemployed worker receives 65 per
cent of the earlier wage indefinitely within a labour market programme: the job and
activity guarantee. The implication is a gradually falling replacement rate over an
unemployment spell. Earlier, the maximum benefit level for the first 100 days of
unemployment was SEK 730, but it was reduced to SEK 680 from 2007 so that the
maximum benefit level is now the same throughout the unemployment spell. Since the
maximum benefit levels have been fixed in nominal terms since 2002 (with the excep-
tion of the cut described above), there has been a gradual reduction in the replacement
rate for high-income earners when their wages have increased. The minimum daily
unemployment benefit has also been held constant (at SEK 320) since 2002, so those
obtaining it (low-income earners and those who are not members of an insurance fund)
have also experienced a gradual fall in the replacement rate.2
An EITC was introduced in 2007 and subsequently expanded in 2008 and 2009. All
working individuals automatically receive a tax reduction on income from employment,
regardless of civil status or number of children in the household. The credit implies
that income below a threshold is tax exempt, while income above it is taxed less than
earlier. The magnitude of the tax credit depends on income from employment, a basic
amount that is indexed to inflation, tax rates in the municipality of residence and the
general tax deduction that the individual is entitled to, which in turn is based on total
income. The design implies that the EITC is phased in up to an annual earnings level
of SEK 318,000 (€ 34,000). Above this level, the credit stays constant, so there is no
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cuts.3
Large reductions in payroll taxes for young people have also been implemented. In
2007, the payroll tax rate for those below 25 was reduced from 32.4 to 21.3 per cent.
There was an additional payroll tax cut from 21.3 to 15.5 per cent in 2009, and the
reductions were then extended also to 25-year-olds.
3 Theoretical framework
We use a search-matching model of the Mortensen-Pissarides type. It is a simplified
version of such a model with taxes as presented in Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).4 We
consider an economy that consists of a large number of identical firms and workers.
Firms produce a homogenous good using labour as the only input. Each firm has one
job slot, which can be filled or vacant. The government levies income taxes on labour
and payroll taxes on firms. Unemployed workers search for employment, and the num-
ber of successful matches depends on the number of vacancies posted by firms and the
number of unemployed workers competing for jobs. Wages are set in Nash bargaining
between workers and firms.
Let the discounted values for a worker being employed and being unemployed be
denoted by VE and VU, respectively. Variables with the superscript i refer to firm i and
variables without a superscript to employment in some other firm. The flow value
functions for a worker in firm i and for an unemployed worker are then:
rV iE ¼ ωiE þ q VU−V iE
  ð1Þ
rVU ¼ bþ s θð Þ VE−VUð Þ; ð2Þ
where r is the exogenous discount rate, q is the exogenous job destruction rate, b is
the after-tax real unemployment benefit, and s is the hazard rate, i.e., the rate at
which unemployed workers exit unemployment, which depends positively on labour
market tightness θ (the ratio between the number of vacancies and the number of
unemployed) so that s ' (θ) > 0. ωiE ¼ wi−TE wið Þ is the after-tax real wage of a worker
in firm i, with wi being the pre-tax real wage and TE the income tax paid by the
worker.
Let ΠiE and Π
i
V denote the values of firm i’s profit streams associated with employ-
ment of a worker and an unfilled vacancy, respectively. Then the following asset return
equations apply:
rΠiE ¼ y−ωiF þ q ΠiV−ΠiE
  ð3Þ
rΠiV ¼ −hþm θð Þ ΠiE−ΠiV
 
; ð4Þ
where y is output per worker, h is the cost of a vacancy and m is the probability of filling a
vacancy, which depends negatively on labour market tightness θ so that m
0
θð Þ < 0 : ωiF ¼
1þ τð Þwi is the real wage cost of a worker to firm i, with τ being a proportional payroll
tax rate.
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ing solution for the real wage in firm i is obtained by solving:
max
lnwi
Λ ¼ λln V iE−VU
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is the elasticity of the individual’s after-tax real wage with respect to the before-tax real
wage. μi, sometimes denoted the coefficient of residual income progression, is a measure
of income tax progressivity. If μi < 1, a one per cent increase in the before-tax real wage
wi causes a less than one per cent increase in the after-tax real wage ωiE , indicating that
the income tax is progressive. This occurs when the marginal tax rate T
0
E is higher
than the average tax rate TE/w
i. The lower the elasticity μi, the more progressive is the
income tax.
Using (1) and (2) to solve for rVU , we obtain:
rVU ¼ r þ qr þ q þ s θð Þ
 
bþ s θð Þ
r þ q þ s θð Þ
 
ωE;
where ωE is the after-tax wage that the worker would obtain in another firm. Substitut-
ing this expression into (7) yields:
λ
μi
1− rþ qrþ qþ s θð Þ
 
ρi − s θð Þrþ qþ s θð Þ
 
ωE=ωiE
  ¼ 1− λð Þ ωiF
y−ωiF
; ð8Þ
where ρi ¼ b=ωiE is the after-tax replacement rate of individual i. Because ωiE ¼ wi−TE wið Þ;
ωE ¼ w−TE wð Þ and ωiF ¼ 1þ τð Þwi , the condition (8) implicitly defines a real wage
equation for an individual worker:
wi ¼ wi ρi; μi ; τ; θ; y;w; r; q; λ : ð9Þ
Here w is the worker’s outside option in terms of the before-tax wage that would be
obtained in another firm. The individual’s real wage thus depends on the net replace-
ment rate ρi (which reflects both the before-tax replacement rate and EITCs), income
tax progressivity μi, the payroll tax rate τ, labour market tightness θ, labour productivity
Bennmarker et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2014) 3:54 Page 6 of 20y and the outside wage w as well as on the real interest rate r, the separation rate q and
the bargaining power of workers λ.
Differentiating (8), we find that:
∂wi
∂ρi













































ϕ ¼ 1− λð Þs θð Þ ωE=ωiE
 þ λ r þ q þ s θð Þð Þ y=ωiF  > 0:
An increase in the individual’s net replacement rate ρi raises the real wage because it
gives the worker a better outside option (higher income if there is no agreement with
the employer and the worker stays unemployed). An increase in the before-tax replace-
ment rate affects the real wage in a similar way as an EITC as both increase the net
replacement rate. A decrease in income tax progressivity, i.e., an increase in the
progressivity variable μi, also raises the wage, as it gives the worker a higher payoff from
a before-tax real wage increase in terms of the after-tax real wage. An increase in the
payroll tax rate τ reduces the real wage because it decreases the surplus that workers
and employers share. An increase in labour market tightness θ has an ambiguous effect
but raises the real wage if ωE=ωiE > ρ
i . The interpretation is that the worker’s outside
option is improved the faster a job can be found in another firm, provided that the
after-tax wage there is higher than the after-tax unemployment benefit. An increase in
labour productivity y raises the real wage because the surplus to be shared between
workers and employers increases. Finally, an increase in the outside wage w also
increases the individual’s wage, as it improves the outside opportunity.
In a symmetric equilibrium, with identical wages across firms, the expressions are
simplified. Imposing wi =w on (9) gives the equilibrium real wage as:
w ¼ 1
1þ τð Þ
λμ r þ q þ s θð Þð Þy
1−λð Þ 1−ρð Þ r þ qð Þ þ λμ r þ q þ s θð Þð Þ½  : ð10Þ
Equation (10) now determines an aggregate equilibrium before-tax real wage, whichcan be written in the general form:
w ¼ w ρ; μ ; τ; θ; y; r; q; λð Þ: ð11Þ
It is straightforward to show that the signs of the partial derivatives of equation (11)are the same as those of equation (9). The only exception is ∂w/∂θ, which is now
unambiguously positive, such that an increase in labour market tightness raises the
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as symmetry implies ωE=ωiE ¼ 1, which gives ωE=ωiE
 
− ρi ¼ 1−ρ > 0.
4 Empirical strategy
Our main focus is on estimating regressions corresponding to equation (9), which ex-
plains individual real wages. The equations are estimated in first differences rather than
in levels. This has several advantages. Measurement errors that are constant over time
are removed. Potential non-stationarities in the data and problems that may arise due
to autocorrelation are also taken care of. By estimating fixed-effects models, we can also
allow for differing individual wage trends.
In the presence of labour market rigidities, it is likely that wage adjustments to labour
market reform may take time to occur. Ideally we would therefore like to allow for a
rich lag structure in the wage equations, but the short sample period (2004-2009)
makes a more dynamic specification unfeasible.5
Since we choose to use the change in the nominal hourly wage as the dependent
variable, inflation Δlnpt has to be added as an explanatory variable. The other main
explanatory variables are the changes in the net replacement rate, the measure of tax
progressivity, the payroll tax rate and the labour market situation.
According to equation (9), the outside wage (the wage that the individual worker
would receive in another firm) and individual productivity should also enter as argu-
ments. It is not obvious how to treat these variables in our data. However, the worker’s
outside option is likely to be a function of individual characteristics. It is reasonable to
assume that the individual’s profession, experience and other traits are proxies for his
opportunities outside the workplace. We therefore add a range of individual controls
that are known to affect individual wages to the equation, specifically educational level
and type, previous unemployment, region of birth, age, gender and civil status. This
amounts to an assumption that such individual characteristics determine different
trends in the outside wage and that individuals base their expectations of it on these
trends. The individual characteristics can also be thought of as capturing trends in indi-
viduals’ productivity. Admittedly, these are crude ways of capturing changes in the out-
side wage and productivity since they do not allow for variations across years. We do,
however, include fixed time effects in some specifications. The remaining variables in
equation (9), i.e., the real interest rate, the job destruction rate and the bargaining
strength parameter, are treated as fixed.
Our benchmark regression equation is thus:
Δlnwit ¼ β0 þ β1Δlnpt þ β2Δρit þ β3Δμit þ β4Δτit þ β5Δθit þ
X
j
β5þjxijt þ ∈ it ;
ð13Þ
where w from now on denotes the nominal hourly wage, and the xj : s denote the
individual control variables. Subscript i denotes the individual and subscript t the time
period.
To account for the evolution of the business cycle during the sample period, we
proceed as follows. First, the wage equation (9) suggests that labour market tightness
should enter as an explanatory variable, and in the empirical specification we let the
change in unemployment in the municipality of residence proxy for changes in the
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aggregate level, we report results both with and without year dummies throughout the
analysis.7 As the changes in the payroll tax during the sample period were related to
the individual’s age (see Section 2), they are proxied by the following dummy variables:
D1it ¼ 1 if ait < 25 f or t ¼ 20070 othwerwise

D2it ¼ 1 if ait < 26 f or t ¼ 2009;0 othwerwise

where ait denotes the individual’s age.
A key challenge is how to deal with the fact that the net replacement rate ρi and the
tax progressivity variable μi for the individual are functions of income (and thus the
wage rate) and therefore endogenous. This is so because tax rates vary with income
and because there has been a fixed nominal floor and a fixed nominal ceiling for the
before-tax unemployment benefit (see Section 2). Moreover, the individual’s net
replacement rate is not directly observable since the wage data apply to employed
persons. We therefore must predict the net replacement rate that the individual would
obtain in the event of unemployment. To address these issues, we compute the net
replacement rate and the tax progressivity variable at the individual level based on
various exogenised measures of income. We try different ways in order to check the
robustness of our results as explained below.
4.1 Benchmark specification
Our first approach is to base the replacement rate and the tax progressivity variable on
the individual’s lagged wage, corrected for average wage growth. This gives us a series
of predicted wages according to:
weit ¼ 1þ γt wit−1; ð14Þ
where ~wit is the predicted nominal wage of individual i at time t, and γt is average wage
growth from period t − 1 to t, i.e., γt ¼ N−1
X
i
wit−wit−1ð Þ=wit−1 with N being the num-
ber of individuals. In a similar fashion we use hours worked in the previous period as a
predictor for actual working time.
The changes in the net replacement rate and the tax progressivity variable in wage
equation (13) are computed with the help of the following equations:
ρit ¼
bit weit lt−1; ueit −TU bitð Þ
weit lt−1−TE weit lt−1  ð15Þ
μit ¼
1−T 0E ~witlt−1ð Þ
1−TE ~witlt−1ð Þ=~witlt−1 ; ð16Þ
where bit now denotes the nominal unemployment benefit of worker i at time t, ueit
denotes the expected unemployment duration of the worker, and TU and TE denote
nominal taxes on unemployment benefits and income from work, respectively.
Equation (13) is then estimated by OLS.
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While using lagged income as a proxy for actual income is appealing in its simplicity, we
also estimate Mincer-type equations and use the wage predictions from these estimations
to compute the net replacement rate and the progressivity variable as a robustness check.
The advantage is that the Mincer equations can be estimated on pre-reform data, which
purges the predicted income measures of any effects of the reforms. Specifically, we
estimate:
lnwMit ¼ φ0 þ
X
j
φjzijt þ λt þ ∈ it ð17Þ
for t < 2007, where the zj:s are independent variables comprising educational level and
type, gender, age, civil status and a dummy indicating whether or not the individual is
foreign born. λt is a fixed time effect. To obtain more accurate predictions after 2006,








f or t < 2007
w^Mi06
Yl
k¼0 1þ γ tþk
 
f or t ¼ 2007þ l; l ¼ 0; 1; 2;
8<
: ð18Þ
where γ t is aggregate wage growth from period t − 1 to t.
8 Having computed the net
replacement rate and the progressivity variable from this exogenised measure of
income, we estimate (13) by OLS.
4.3 An instrumental variables approach
An alternative to estimating (13) by OLS is to use changes in the net replacement rate
and in the progressivity variable based on the Mincer predictions as instruments for
Δρit and Δμit in 2SLS estimations.
In the first stage we estimate:
Δρit ¼ χ0 þ χ1ΔρMit þ
X
j
χ1þjxijt þ ∈1it ; ð19Þ
Δμit ¼ ψ0 þ ψ1ΔμMit þ
X
j
ψ1þjxijt þ ∈2it ; ð20Þ












. In the second
stage, the predicted Δρit and Δμit from (20) and (21) are used when estimating (13).
4.4 Wage equations at the group level
Consistent with the aggregate wage equation (11), we complement the wage equations
at the individual level by regressions on group averages. This is a crude way of address-
ing the theoretical concern that, for example, a change in the net replacement rate may
have spillover effects across individuals in a particular labour market, i.e., that the indi-
vidual's wage is not only affected by a change in the own replacement rate but also by
changes in other workers' replacement rates via the effects on their wages and thus
on the individual’s outside option. More precisely, we divide the individuals into
percentiles based on the distribution implied by the Mincer predictions in 2006. The
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skill levels and the average wage in the percentile as a proxy for the equilibrium
wage in that market. The reason we condition on the 2006 distribution is that we
want to purge the replacement rate and the progressivity variable of wage effects
induced by changes in these variables.
We thus compute the average actual wage, the average net replacement rate and the


















where k denotes the percentile, and nkt denotes group size. We estimate the following
model:
Δ lnwkt ¼ αk þ η1Δρkt þ η2Δμkt þ λt þ ∈kt ; ð21Þ
where αk is a group-specific fixed effect which, given that we are estimating first differ-
ences, is equivalent to including a group-specific trend. To account for the fact that
group size may vary over time, we weigh the estimations by average group size.
The aggregation comes at a cost, however. Since aggregating the data reduces the
number of observations substantially, the precision of the estimates decreases.
5 Data
We use data from the LINDA database, including register data and survey-based infor-
mation on wages. The database contains a large sample of individuals 18-64 years of
age. We select individuals who were employed at least once during the period 2004-
2009 and follow them over time. The database also holds detailed information on age,
gender, working time as a share of full-time employment, civil status, educational level
and type, place of birth and earlier unemployment.
Membership in the unemployment insurance funds described in Section 2 is approxi-
mately 75 per cent of employment (Akademikernas a-kassa 2012). We compute the net
replacement rate as the one that each worker would obtain as a member of an un-
employment insurance fund. There exist data neither on whether individuals are actually
members in such funds nor on whether they have any supplementary unemployment in-
surance.9 Such supplementary insurance is often provided by trade unions and sometimes
in collective agreements.
We are thus estimating the statistical relationship between the wage and the net re-
placement rate that employed workers would get if they are members in an unemploy-
ment insurance fund and receive no supplementary benefits. This can be viewed in two
ways. One is to regard the computed net replacement rate as the one which workers
perceive and which therefore influences wage setting. Such an interpretation receives
support from the strong focus in the public discussion on benefit levels in the un-
employment insurance provided by the funds and evidence on low awareness among
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measurement error in our replacement-rate variable. The change in the actual net
replacement rate may be both lower and higher than our proxy. If the measurement
error is randomly distributed, there is an attenuation bias in our estimates so that we
will underestimate the true effects of the replacement rate on wages.11
When computing net replacement rates, we approximate expected unemployment
duration by the pre-2007 distribution of length of unemployment spells. Average
unemployment duration is computed for each wage decile, and the estimates are
subsequently applied to each individual in that part of the distribution.
Descriptive statistics for key variables are given in Table 1. The table shows that the
wage is increasing over time and that there is substantial wage dispersion in the sample.
Wages grow at an annual rate in the range of 3.7-5.8 per cent, peaking in 2008.
The net replacement rate, based on predicted wages according to (14), is decreasing
over time, with the largest decrease occurring between 2006 and 2007, when the first
step of the EITC was introduced at the same time as unemployment benefits were
lowered.12 The mean net replacement rate was over 70 per cent in 2005 but decreases
by more than 10 percentage points until 2009.
The progressivity variable, also based on wage predictions, is falling over the period
2005-2008, reflecting an increase in progressivity induced by lower average taxes. Pro-
gressivity does, however, decrease slightly between 2008 and 2009 when the threshold
for paying the state income tax was raised.
The average local unemployment rate fell from 5.9 per cent in 2005 to 3.7 per cent in
2008 but then increased again to 5.9 per cent in 2009. Mean working time, as a share
of full-time employment, is stable slightly below 90 per cent, but there is large
dispersion in the sample. The average individual is 42 years of age, and the sample is
comprised of equal shares of men and women.6 Results
Table 2 displays the results from estimating the benchmark version of equation (13), in
which the replacement rate and the progressivity variable are based on the individual's
lagged wage corrected for aggregate wage growth.13 We start by running simple regres-
sions of the difference in the log wage on the first differences in the net replacement
rate and the progressivity measure and then gradually add more variables. All columns
exploit the full sample except columns (8) and (9), which exclude entrepreneurs and
part-time employed, respectively. In columns (10) and (11), year dummies are included
and in column 12, individual fixed effects.
In all the regressions there is a significant, positive relation between the change in
the net replacement rate and wage growth as hypothesised, with most estimated semi-
elasticities in the range of 0.33-0.40. A reduction in income tax progressivity (an in-
crease in the variable) also has a significantly positive effect on wage growth, although
this effect is much smaller than for the net replacement rate (a semi-elasticity around
0.04).14 When the dummies for payroll tax reductions are included in columns (7) and
(11), they are insignificant.
The change in the municipality unemployment rate has a small, but significant, negative
impact on wage growth in all but one of the equations where it is included. Inflation is
Table 1 Descriptive statistics, 2005-2009
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Monthly wage Mean 24 205 25 115 25 795 27 115 27 991
St Dev 11 591 12 171 12 229 12 527 12 590
Min 10 000 12 000 12 000 12 000 12 000
Max 1 043 707 1 232 252 960 882 736 626 668 145
Wage growth Mean .037 .044 .041 .058 .037
St Dev .117 .120 .125 .124 .119
Min -2.141 -2.086 -1.940 -2.004 -2.196
Max 2.340 2.477 1.754 2.014 2.310
Net replacement rate Mean .710 .697 .630 .603 .582
St Dev .129 .133 .131 .132 .133
Min .032 .023 .019 .024 .031
Max .860 .859 .795 .795 .795
Net replacement rate growth Mean -.016 -.072 -.032 -.023
St Dev .051 .056 .056 .056
Min -.571 -.654 -.567 -.575
Max .614 .434 .505 .579
Progressivity variable Mean .871 .868 .858 .851 .864
St Dev .090 .088 .097 .100 .092
Min .672 .666 .647 .641 .637
Max 1 1 1 1 1
Change in progressivity variable Mean -.004 -.012 -.009 .012
St Dev .067 .068 .073 .080
Min -.314 -.338 -.354 -.350
Max .319 .326 .339 .346
Local unemployment Mean .059 .053 .039 .037 .059
St Dev .016 .015 .012 .012 .018
Min .023 .021 .013 .009 .018
Max .141 .115 .089 .094 .138
Hours worked Mean .896 .898 .898 .897 .897
St Dev .215 .215 .214 .217 .216
Min .010 .006 .010 .004 .010
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Age Mean 42.073 42.000 41.926 41.936 42.211
Male Mean .500 .506 .501 .503 .498
Max observations 119 438 119 236 124 426 122 977 119 296
Note: The net replacement rate and the progressivity variable are based on wage predictions according to equation (14).
Local unemployment is calculated as the unemployment-to-population ratio. Both openly unemployed and participants
in labour market programmes are counted as unemployed.
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Age is negatively correlated with wage growth, suggesting that younger workers face
steeper earnings profiles than older workers.
In Table 3, the net replacement rate and the progressivity variable are based on
Mincer wage predictions. The point estimates of the wage semi-elasticity with respect
to the net replacement rate are in all cases except one lower than in the benchmark
Table 2 Estimated wage equations when the replacement rate and progressivity variable are based on lagged wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Inflation .766*** .725*** .724*** .726*** .740*** .647*** .514***
(.014) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.020) (.021)
Change in replacement rate .343*** .332*** .367*** .369*** .368*** .369*** .365*** .490*** .395*** .395*** .547***
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.004)
Change in progressivity variable .111*** .028*** .040*** .040*** .040*** .040*** .040*** .039*** .034*** .034*** .040***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Change in unemployment rate -.057*** -.058*** -.054*** -.036** -.319*** -.121*** -.121*** -.007
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.019) (.033) (.033) (.000)
Dummy for earlier unemployment -.001*** -.001 -.001 -.001 .006*** -.001 -.001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001)
Male -.018 -.020 -.027 -.027 .009 -.498*** -.019 -.019
(.045) (.045) (.045) (.045) (.045) (.049) (.045) (.045)
Age -.089*** -.089*** -.226*** -.217*** -.231*** -.363*** -.224*** -.236*** -.005***
(.002) (.002) (.015) (.016) (.015) (.017) (.015) (.016) (.001)
Age squared .157*** .148*** .163*** .282*** .153*** .165*** .000***
(.017) (.018) (.016) (.018) (.017) (.018) (.000)
Payroll dummy 2007 .004 -.002
(.003) (.002)
Payroll dummy 2009 .000 -.003
(.002) (.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneurs excluded Yes
Full-time employed Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects Yes
N 382 548 382 548 382 548 382545 382 545 382 545 382 545 374 786 291 656 382 545 382 545 382 545
R2 .031 .005 .031 .048 .048 .049 .049 .049 .078 .050 .050 .084
Note: Dependent variable: first difference of log nominal wage. Sample period: 2006-2009. Where indicated, the controls comprise educational level and type, region of birth and civil status. The constant is not
reported. Robust standard errors are reported within parenthesis. ***: significant at the 1 per cent level; **: significant at the 5 per cent level; *: significant at the 10 per cent level. The coefficients and standard errors for













Table 3 Estimated wage equations when the replacement rate and progressivity variable are based on estimated Mincer wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Inflation .660*** .688*** .685*** .687*** .707*** .595***
(.015) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.021)
Change in replacement rate .083*** .086*** .220*** .210*** .203*** .203*** .201*** .161*** .324*** .328*** .641***
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.011) (.022) (.022) (.024)
Change in progressivity variable -.015*** -.017*** .010*** .009*** .008*** .008*** .008*** .008*** .004 .004 .006*
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Change in unemployment rate .051*** .055*** .052*** .077*** -.076*** -.124*** -.124*** -.040
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.020) (.034) (.034) (.039)
Dummy for earlier unemployment .004*** .004*** .004*** .004*** .008*** .004*** .004*** .007***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Male -.054 -.039 -.045 -.044 -.014 -.237*** -.047 -.047
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.050) (.046) (.046)
Age -.090*** -.088*** -.263*** -.259*** -.266*** -.388*** -.253*** -.259*** -.994***
(.002) (.002) (.014) (.016) (.014) (.017) (.015) (.016) (.092)
Age squared .204*** .199*** .208*** .325*** .189*** .195*** .897***
(.016) (.017) (.016) (.018) (.016) (.017) (.091)
Payroll dummy 2007 -.000 -.003
(.003) (.003)
Payroll dummy 2009 .002 .001
(.002) (.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Entrepreneurs excluded Yes
Full-time employed Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects Yes
N 427 959 427 959 427 959 427 956 427 956 427 956 427 956 418 773 320 026 427 956 427 956 427 956
R2 .000 .000 .000 .014 .014 .014 .014 .015 .020 .015 .015 .010
Note: Dependent variable: first difference of log nominal wage. Sample period: 2006-2009. Where indicated, the controls comprise educational level and type, region of birth and civil status. The constant is not
reported. Robust standard errors are reported within parenthesis. ***: significant at the 1 per cent level; **: significant at the 5 per cent level; *: significant at the 10 per cent level. The coefficients and standard errors for
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effects of progressivity on the wage are of the same order of magnitude as before.
Again, we find no significant effects of the payroll tax dummies. In these regressions,
previous unemployment is positively related to wage growth, although the effect is very
small, whereas the (very small) effect of municipal unemployment is unstable.
The results from using the replacement rate and the progressivity measure based on
Mincer wages as instruments for the actual variables are displayed in Table 4. This
yields estimates for the effect of the net replacement rate that are very similar to those
obtained by the OLS-estimations in Table 3.15 But here the point estimates for the pro-
gressivity variable are much larger than before: with controls included they are in the
interval 0.44–0.54. The 2009 payroll tax dummy is now significantly positive (indicating
a wage-raising effect of the reduction for young people). The impact of municipalTable 4 Estimated wage equations when the replacement rate and progressivity variable
are instrumented by reform variables based on estimated Mincer wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Inflation .843*** .745*** .736*** .743*** .761*** .675***
(.048) (.031) (.031) (.032) (.031) (.042)
Change in replacement
rate
.107*** .201*** .215*** .246*** .241*** .241*** .239*** .181***
(.010) (.020) (.024) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019)
Change in progressivity
variable
-.330*** -.401*** .442*** .540*** .485*** .504*** .494*** .429***
(.064) (.074) (.126) (.155) (.155) (.161) (.160) (.155)
Change in unemployment
rate
-.214*** -.189*** -.204*** -.165*** -.301***
(.059) (.059) (.064) (.060) (.064)
Dummy for earlier
unemployment
.003*** .003*** .003*** .003*** .007***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Male .044 .073 .061 .064 .095* -.160***
(.051) (.053) (.052) (.053) (.052) (.059)
Age -.096*** -.096*** -.247*** -.235*** -.249*** -.385***
(.002) (.002) (.015) (.017) (.015) (.017)
Age squared .176*** .164*** .180*** .311***
(.018) (.020) (.018) (.021)
Payroll dummy 2007 -.001
(.002)
Payroll dummy 2009 .004**
(.002)





















Note: Dependent variable: first difference of log nominal wage. Sample period: 2006-2009. IV estimations (2SLS). Where
indicated, the controls comprise educational level and type, region of birth and civil status. The constant is not reported.
Robust standard errors are reported within parenthesis. ***: significant at the 1 per cent level; **: significant at the 5 per
cent level; *: significant at the 10 per cent level. The coefficients and standard errors for Male and Age have been
multiplied by 100, and the coefficient and standard errors for Age squared by 1002.
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ciated with wage growth, although the effect remains very small.
Table 5 shows the estimations with percentile groups as the unit of observation. As
shown in columns (1)-(4), the relation between the average net replacement rate and
the mean wage is significant and positive. The estimated magnitude is of the same
order as in Tables 3 and 4 and obtains regardless of whether we include group fixed
effects and weights capturing group size. The progressivity variable, however, becomes
insignificant in these percentile equations. Columns (5) and (6) show that when adding
time dummies, also the net replacement rate becomes insignificant. This is not surpris-
ing as much of the variation in the data is already removed when aggregating the
observations into percentiles and adding year dummies further consumes some of the
remaining variation. We interpret the findings from the group estimations as broadly
consistent with our results from the analysis of individual wages.
Overall, our estimates imply semi-elasticities between an individual's wage and the net
replacement rate of the order of magnitude of 0.2-0.4. How should one interpret these
magnitudes and how do they relate to the results in other studies referred to in Section 1?
Writing in terms of differentials instead of differences as above, we have estimated the
semi-elasticity dlnwi/dρi = β2, where ρi ¼ b=ωiE and ωiE ¼ wi−TE wið Þ . The elasticity of
the wage with respect to the unemployment benefit is dlnwi/dlnb = β2ρ
i/(1 + β2ρ
i). Setting
ρi = 0.65 (see Table 1), it follows that our estimates of the semi-elasticity β2 implies a wage
elasticity with respect to the benefit level in the range 0.12-0.21. This is close to, but
somewhat larger, than most of the estimates of the elasticity of the reservation wage with
respect to the unemployment benefit level reported in Section 1.
We can also compute what our estimated semi-elasticities imply for the incidence of
the EITC. To simplify, we make the calculation assuming that the income tax on wage
income is proportional, i.e., that ωiE ¼ 1−tð Þwi , where t is the tax rate, and (1 − t) is the
net-of-tax rate. Then it is straightforward to show that the elasticity of the wage with re-
spect to the net-of tax rate is equal to minus the elasticity of the wage with respect to the
unemployment benefit, i.e., dlnwi/dln(1 − t) = − β2ρ
i/(1 + β2ρ
i). The elasticity of the after-
tax wage with respect to the net-of-tax rate is dlnωiE=dln 1−tð Þ ¼ 1− β2ρi= 1þ β2ρið Þ½  . ItTable 5 Estimated wage equations at the percentile income group level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in mean replacement rate .200*** .200*** .199*** .199*** -.086 -.078
(.046) (.046) (.046) (.046) (.182) (.182)
Change in mean of progressivity variable .001 .000 .019
(.017) (.017) (.016)
Group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
N 400 400 400 400 400 400
R2 .060 .060 .060 .060 .255 .258
Note: Dependent variable: first difference of log nominal wage. Sample period: 2006-2009. Mean wages and reform
variables are computed over percentile income intervals based on the 2006 income distribution implied by predicted
Mincer wages. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors are reported within parenthesis. ***: significant at the
1 per cent level; **: significant at the 5 per cent level; *: significant at the 10 per cent level. Weights indicate average
group size.
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0.21 per cent in the before-tax wage and an increase of 0.79-0.88 per cent in the after-tax
wage. The shifting of the EITC onto employers through lower wages, according to our
study, is thus somewhat smaller than according to the studies for the US and the UK
referred to in Section 1.7 Conclusions
There exists a large empirical literature on the effects of unemployment benefits and
earned income tax credits (EITCs) on unemployment and employment. But the mecha-
nisms through which these variables are affected have been much less studied. Wage
formation is likely to be a very important channel. We set up a theoretical model where
both unemployment benefits and EITCs influence wages through their effects on the
net (after-tax) replacement rate for the unemployed. The model is used to explain
wages in Sweden in 2006-09, when an EITC was introduced in several steps and benefit
generosity reduced, employing a large micro data set for individuals.
A key challenge is how to handle the reverse-causality problem that the net replace-
ment rate is an endogenous variable: since it is not only the case that the wage depends
on the net replacement rate, the unemployment benefit and tax rules it also implies
that the net replacement rate depends on wage income. We address this problem by
trying to exogenise the replacement rate in various ways: by computing measures based
on lagged wages corrected for aggregate wage growth, by predicting wages through
Mincer equations and by instrumentation.
When estimating wage equations for individuals, we find strong, significant wage
effects from variations in the net replacement rate. The estimated semi-elasticities are
mostly in the interval 0.2-0.4. This implies absolute values of the elasticities of the wage
with respect to the unemployment benefit level and to the net-of-tax rate of 0.1-0.2.
Aggregating individuals into percentiles of the wage distribution gives less stark results
but also suggests a positive correlation between the net replacement rate and wages.
Our findings thus support the hypothesis that the recent introduction of an EITC and
reduction in unemployment benefit levels in Sweden were conducive to wage moderation.
One should, however, interpret our results with some caution. Strictly speaking, we
have found a statistically significant relationship between the wage for an individual
and the net replacement rate that this individual would get from being a member of an
unemployment insurance fund in the absence of supplementary benefits provided by
unions or in collective agreements. We have argued that this is a good proxy for the
perceived net replacement rate.
It should also be noted that the estimates from our wage equations for individuals
do not take account of spillover effects on other wages because wage reductions in one
firm deteriorate the outside option for workers in other firms. Hence, our estimates
are best regarded as relative-wage effects. The general-equilibrium effects on the
aggregate wage are likely to be larger than in our estimates: a general reduction in the
net replacement rate will for each worker have both a direct effect (from the change in
the own replacement rate) and an indirect effect (from the wage decrease for other
workers induced by the reduction in their replacement rates) reinforcing the direct
effect.
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would be desirable to measure the actual replacement rates better by taking account of
supplementary benefits provided by unions or in collective agreements. Data on such
insurance do not exist, but proxies might be constructed by attributing union member-
ship to individuals from information on sector of employment and education. Second,
it would be interesting to include direct measures of the outside wage rather than
controlling for individual characteristics. Ideally, we would like to gauge the spillover
effects on individual wages from the impact of changes in the net replacement rate for
other workers in the same labour market in order to analyze the general-equilibrium
effects. Third, as more data become available over time, assessing the long-term effects
by estimating models with richer dynamics would shed additional light on the workings
of the reforms. Fourth, one should be aware that no legislated mimimum wages exist in
Sweden. An interesting extension would be to compare the responsiveness of wages to
the EITC and unemployment benefits in Sweden with the responsiveness in countries
with such mimimum wage legislation.
EITCs and reductions in unemployment benefits are widely used policy tools in the
fight against unemployment. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our results suggest
that such reforms strengthen incentives for wage restraint, which is likely to be
employment-promoting.Endnotes
1One of the few exceptions is Forslund et al. (2008) who use the Nordic countries as
a panel.
2The Swedish unemployment insurance and the recent changes in it are described in
detail in Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2008; 2011).
3See Edmark et al. (2012) for a detailed description of the tax credit and the
extensions made in 2008 and 2009.
4See pp 751-764.
5Most collective wage agreements during the period have been for two or three years.
However, the collective agreements, which are concluded at the industry level, mainly
concern average wage increases in firms. The distribution of wage increases between
individuals are negotiated each year at the level of the firm, very often without any
guaranteed wage increases for individuals. In some collective agreements, no numbers
for wage increases are specified at all; instead, wage increases are determined in annual
bargaining between individual union members and the employer. The wage-setting
arrangements described could motivate a fairly quick response of individual wages to
various changes in the economic environment.
6Because there are no data on vacancies per municipality, labour market tightness
cannot be computed.
7Our estimations cover the onset of the international financial crisis in 2008/2009. It
is, of course, possible that the specific conditions prevailing then could have affected
the responsiveness of wages to our various explanatory variables. This problem is difficult
to address with the few years we have in our data set, but it should be kept in mind.
8In the benchmark wage equations in Section 4.1, we instead used average wage
growth. This measure refers to the average wage growth between two years for those
Bennmarker et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2014) 3:54 Page 19 of 20individuals who were employed in two consecutive years and thus includes individual
career effects. Aggregate wage growth refers instead to the growth in the average wage
of the entire sample between two years. Comparing actual wages to the Mincer predic-
tions reveals that aggregate wage growth gives more accurate forecasts over the wage
distribution than average wage growth. Another difference compared to the benchmark
equations is that instead of using hours worked in the preceding year as a proxy for ac-
tual hours, we here assume full-time employment. The advantage of assuming full-time
employment is that we can include also individuals who are temporarily out of work in
the estimations. The disadvantage is that we may generate measurement errors in
the exogenised income measure to the extent that the part-time employed are
misrepresented.
9In principle, one could include other sources of insurance in the replacement rate,
such as income within the household, to capture informal insurance within families.
However, since our focus is on the effects of the labour market reforms, we want to
purge the net replacement rate from such influence.
10According to a survey commissioned by the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2010),
only 4 per cent of the unemployed stated that they received supplementary benefits,
although 20 per cent of the unemployed were entitled to such benefits provided by
unions.
11To the extent that the measurement error is correlated with the true net replacement
rate, the bias may be larger or smaller than the attenuation bias with randomly distributed
errors. This depends on the sign of the correlation and the relative magnitudes of the vari-
ances of the measurement error and the actual replacement rate (See e.g. Pischke 2007).
Not much can be said about possible correlations and relative variances in our data.
12Descriptive statistics for the net replacement rate and the progressivity variable
based on actual wages are displayed in Bennmarker et al. (2011). It is shown that the
measures based on wage predictions have a high degree of accuracy.
13Our data comprise the period 2004-09, but since two years are spent predicting
wages on lagged values and then taking first differences, our estimations cover the
period 2006-09. Throughout the analysis, we report robust standard errors, but the main
effects remain significant also when standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.
14The result that lower progressivity is positively correlated with wage growth is
consistent with the results in, for example, Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund
and Kolm (1995) and Hansen et al. (2000).
15It should be noted that if the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement
error, the IV estimates are consistent (see, for instance, Johnston and DiNardo 1997). It
is therefore reassuring that the estimates of the coefficients for the net replacement rate
are close to those in the OLS estimations.
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